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EMINENT DOMAIN-Blight Declaration-Extensive Delay in
Initiating Condemnation After Declaration of Blight May Con-
stitute a Taking Under State Constitution. Washington Market
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 343 A.2d 408
(1975).
In 1958, the City of Trenton examined the possibility of redevel-
oping a large portion of its downtown area. In 1967, after a tortuous
planning process, the land designated for redevelopment was de-
clared blighted. Plaintiff, the owner of a large commercial building
in this redevelopment area, alleged that in 1963 it began losing
tenants because of the widespread publicity given to the threatened
condemnation. After the 1967 declaration of blight, the area deterio-
rated markedly. By 1973, plaintiff's building was almost entirely
vacant, yielding $6,300 in rent compared to costs of $9,500 in insur-
ance charges and $30,000 in annual property taxes. Plaintiff sought
an order requiring the defendant to condemn its property, or alter-
natively to pay damages for the diminished value of property.' The
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that plaintiff alleged a cause of
action despite the absence of a direct taking by the defendant.2
There are generally two types of state condemnation statutes. 3
The traditional statute is patterned after the unjust taking provi-
sion of the fifth amendment of the U.S. Constitution which requires
just compensation for the taking of private property for public use.4
What constitutes a taking has been the subject of much decisional
law5 and legal commentary.' It has been the traditional rule that a
1. Washington Market Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 110-12, 343 A.2d
408, 409-10 (1975).
2. Id. at 123-24, 343 A.2d at 416-17.
3. The two types of statutes have about equal representation among the states. For a
listing, see Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a
Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1439, n.3 (1974).
4. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
5. See, e.g., Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d
305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
6. See generally Sax, Takings, Private Property & Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
The takings issue has been most frequently litigated recently in respect to wetland legislation,
see Note, State & Local Wetlands Regulation: the Problem of Taking Without Just
Compensation, 58 VA. L. REV. 876 (1972), and landmark preservation, see Note, Landmark
Preservation Laws: Compensation for Temporary Taking, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 362 (1968).
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taking of property in the constitutional sense required an actual
physical invasion or direct legal restraint on its use.7
The second type of condemnation statute allows recovery not only
for a governmental taking but also for property damage caused by
a governmental body without a taking.'
Since the New Jersey constitution9 contains the first type of con-
demnation provision, the court in Washington Market had to find
a taking by the government. In so finding, the court arguably has
gone further than any previous court in like circumstances.'"
In reviewing eminent domain suits, state courts have looked to
the extensive federal body of law in the area to understand the
constitutional requirements that must be met."1 Traditionally, it
has been the character of the invasion and not the amount of
7. See NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.38(1) (rev. 3d ed. 1974) states:
[T]he Supreme Court of the United States and the great majority of the state courts
have adhered to the old doctrine and hold that when the owner of property continues
in use and possession as before, it is not taken in the constitutional sense, however
much it may be depreciated in value. In other words, when a municipal or public
service corporation .. .inflicts injury upon private land under authority of and in
compliance with an act of the legislature, and there has been no want of reasonable
care or skill in the execution of the power, such party is not liable in an action at law
for such injury, even though the same act if done without legislative sanction would
be actionable, unless the injury is of such a character as to deprive the owner of the
use and possession of his land, or compensation is required by special statutory or
constitutional provision whenever property is damaged by the construction of a public
improvement.
8. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14 which provides in part: "Private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having first been made to,
or paid into court for the owner .
9. N.J. CONST. art. 1, 20.
10. Although there have been a number of decisions that have either allowed recovery or
found a valid cause of action for damages arising from a declaration of blight, in all of these
cases condemnation proceedings were eventually begun. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit,
254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966); Elmwood Park Project Section 1, Group B v. Cassese,
376 Mich. 311, 136 N.W.2d 896 (1965). Moreover, in each instance, the delaying tactics on
the part of the government more directly interfered with the property owner's interest than
was the case in Washington Market. See, e.g., Sayre v. United States, 282 F. Supp. 175 (ND.
Ohio 1967) (notices sent to residents informing them of the impending condemnation, and
denial of request by plaintiff's bankrupt. to repair its property). See also Comment, Delay,
Abandonment of Condemnation, and Just Compensation, 41 So. CALIF. L. REV. 862 (1968).
For a more complete discussion of the significance of Washington Market, see text accompa-
nying notes 45-59 infra.
11. For an overview of these guidelines, see Dunham, Griggs v: Allegheny County In
Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63 (1962).
For a new insight into eminent domain law, see Sax, supra note 6.
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resulting damage that determines whether there has been a taking.'2
Typically, a taking requires a physical invasion or a conversion.' 3
Thus, an invasion of land by water, sand, earth, and other material
constitutes a taking,'4 while a zoning ordinance which only restricts
the use of the land does not.'5 It is difficult to reconcile the different
treatment of these two situations since both involve a similar quan-
tum of damage. Yet the Supreme Court has always separated the
zoning power from that of eminent domain and has allowed recovery
only in situations involving the latter.'" The rationale is that emi-
nent domain involves the taking of property for public use, while
zoning involves regulating property in order to prevent its use to the
detriment of the public.'7
The treatment given the zoning power has been extended to other
legislative enactments similar to the declaration of blight in
Washington Market. For example, in Danforth v. United States,'
the Supreme Court held that a condemnor is free to discontinue a
project at any time and may not be liable for dimunition in property
values which resulted from legislation enacted in respect to the
project.'9 The rationale of the Court was that such changes in value
were "incidents of ownership. . . .[and could not] be considered
as a 'taking' in the constitutional sense." '
Those state courts which have ruled on the precise issue in
Washington Market, have reasoned along Danforth lines, and thus
have found in favor of the condemnor.2
In Cayon v. City of Chicopee,22 plaintiff owned land which the
defendant publicly announced would be taken for urban renewal
12. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 385 (1916).
13. See note 7 supra.
14. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
15. Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
16. Compare Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) with Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
17. Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962, 978 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
see Sax, Takings & the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
18. 308 U.S. 271 (1939).
19. Id. at 286-87.
20. Id. at 285.
21. See, e.g., Hilltop Properties, Inc. v. State, 233 Cal. App. 2d 349, 43 Cal. Rptr. 605
(1965); Chicago v. Loitz, 11111. App. 3d 42, 295 N.E.2d 478 (1973); Buffalo v. J.W. Clement
Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 269 N.E.2d 895, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971).
22. __ Mass. -, 277 N.E.2d 116 (1971).
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purposes. The city failed to take the property officially, but demo-
lished other buildings preparatory to urban renewal. Plaintiff al-
leged that as a result of these activities he was deprived of the
productive use of his property, and the ability to sell it or pay the
taxes levied. He requested a finding that the conduct of the govern-
ment constituted a "taking" of his property." The court, basing part
of its disagreement on public policy, 4 discussed the great deal of
planning involved in urban renewal projects, much of which must
be done prior to the construction phase of the project." An impor-
tant aspect of the project involves notice to the community of the
proposed action so that residents have an opportunity to represent
their interests. The court observed that if such a public announce-
ment warranted compensation for the diminished property value,
the purpose of the announcement would be frustrated and subse-
quent proceedings hampered."
Plaintiffs often demand consequential damages resulting from the
condemnation of adjacent properties. In Orfield v. Housing & Re-
development Authority," the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a
trial court's denial of such relief noting" that the
Urban Renewal Area Project arose out of the decline of the area, and the
decline was not the result of the urban renewal project. Therefore, much of
the deterioration of the neighborhood complained of by petitioners was under
way prior to the housing authority activity and, indeed, might well have
progressed even faster had there been no renewal project.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, prior to Washington Market,
had also consistently found in favor of the condemnor absent direct
invasion of absolute conversion. In Morristown Board of Education
v. Palmer,"6 the New Jersey Highway Department planned to con-
struct a six lane interstate highway which would pass within 40 feet
of a wing of one elementary school. Plaintiffs contended that theproposed highway would render the school "useless" as an elemen-
tary school facility because of the danger to pupils, the problem of
23. Id. at -, 277 NE.2d at 117.
24. Id. at . , 277 N.E.2d at 117, 119.
25. Id. at -, 277 N.E.2d at 119-20.
26. Id. at -, 277 N.E.2d at 119-20.
27. - Minn. -, 232 N.W.2d 923 (1975).
28. Id. at ', 232 N.W.2d at 927.
29. 88 N.J. Super. 378, 212 A.2d 564 (App. Div. 1965), rev'd, 46 N.J. 522, 218 A.2d 153
(1966).
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air pollution and noxious fumes, and the noise of traffic which would
substantially handicap the teaching process. Plaintiffs demanded
that the Highway Department be compelled to institute condemna-
tion proceedings and that pending such proceedings the Highway
Department be stayed from taking any further action on the project
which substantially affected the use of the schooi.30
The superior court held that it was error for the trial court to have
dismissed the action summarily and remanded the case for a full
hearing on whether the use of the school was being totally or sub-
stantially destroyed so as to constitute a taking as was alleged.' On
appeal, the supreme court reversed, finding that the "project as
presently planned . . . reveals . . . no physical invasion of the
school premises . *."..32 Prior to that appeal, the Highway Depart-
ment had changed its plans so that the highway would not encircle
the school with its access roads or ramps.3 Thus, Palmer clearly
demonstrates that property suffering only consequential damage as
a result of non-confiscatory government action is excluded from the
compensatory scope of the New Jersey constitutional taking provi-
sion. Palmer, however, expressly left open "[tihe question of
whether a total or substantial destruction of the beneficial use of
property amounts to a taking in the constitutional sense . . . .34
It was this issue that confronted the court in Washington Market.
Cases involving claims for relief from blight declarations had been
brought before the New Jersey Supreme Court prior to Washington
Market. In discussing these cases, the court distinguished them, and
attempted to limit Washington Market to its facts. In one such case,
Wilson v. City of Long Branch,35 plaintiffs urged that the "'very
determination of blight in itself constitutes a taking of property'"
because the property's market value is thereby diminished or de-
stroyed and with the Damocles sword of condemnation hanging over
it, sale would be difficult.3 ' The court rejected the argument by
equating such a result with that which often occurs as a result of
30. Id. at 382-85, 212 A.2d at 565-67.
31. Id. at 391, 212 A.2d at 571.
32. 46 N.J. 522, 525, 218 A.2d 153, 155 (1966).
33. Id. at 525, 218 A.2d at 155.
34. 68 N.J. at 116, 343 A.2d at 412.
35. 27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958).
36. Id. at 374, 142 A.2d at 844.
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municipal zoning and is non-compensable.37 The court in
Washington Market distinguished Wilson by noting that it did not
refer to the situation where, in addition to a declaration of blight,
the passage of time and other related factors "are said to have shorn
property of literally all or most of its value."38
The degree of directional change that Washington Market repre-
sents is best demonstrated by comparing it with Freeman v.
Paterson Redevelopment Agency.3" In Freeman, a government
agency issued a declaration of blight for an area which included the
plaintiff's commercial property. It took no action for over ten years
and then informed the plaintiff that it would not be taking his
property after all. During the ten year period, plaintiff lost one of
his two commercial tenants and was unable to rent the property to
another tenant. The defendant's employees told prospective tenants
that plaintiff's property would soon be taken but condemnation
proceedings were never initiated. Plaintiff sought the appointment
of a commission to assess damages or, alternatively, an order that
the agency initiate condemnation proceedings." The court held that
"under the New Jersey approach the facts that plaintiff relies upon
to establish a constructive taking would be appropriate to establish
the quantum of damages after initiation of condemnation, but do
not justify the compelling of that condemnation itself." 41
The single factor which differentiates Washington Market from
Freeman is the greater percentage of rental income loss suffered by
the plaintiff in the instant case.42 The court in Washington Market,
however, does not base its decision on a threshold amount but rather
generally discusses the recent extensions of the "taking" concept43
37. Id., 42 A.2d at 845.
38. 68 N.J. at 115, 343 A.2d at 412.
39. 128 N.J. Super. 448, 456-57, 320 A.2d 228 (Law Div. 1974).
40. Id. at 450-53, 320 A.2d at 229-30.
41. Id. at 456, 320 A.2d at 232.
42. The plaintiffs property in Washington Market generated $160,000 in rent revenues
in 1963 as compared with $6,300 in 1973. 68 N.J. at 113, 343 A.2d at 410. Although no figures
are stated in Freeman, the plaintiff lost only his commercial tenant for the first floor of his
building but retained the commercial tenant on the second floor and the two residential
tenants on the third floor. 128 N.J. Super. at 452, 320 A.2d at 230.
43. The court initially considers those "taking" cases concerning low-flying airplanes. In
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), the Supreme Court granted recovery for dam-
ages resulting from overflights that interfered with plaintiff's chicken farm. In Griggs v.
Alleghany County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), the Court granted recovery to a homeowner whose
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and the hardships that may flow from blight declarations." But
close analysis of these recent extensions of the "taking" concept,
demonstrates that Washington Market goes further than other
"blight" cases that have found in favor of the property owner.
Illustrative of these cases is City of Cleveland v. Carcione15 In
Carcione, plaintiff owned property consisting of two stores and four-
teen dwelling units in an area which the city of Cleveland sought to
condemn for an urban renewal project. After declaring the area
blighted, the city sent eviction notices to the residents and occu-
pants of the property owned by plaintiff and began demolishing
buildings in the surrounding area. These two actions combined to
cause an exodus of the inhabitants from the area which, in conjunc-
tion with an alleged reduction in police protection, led to extensive
vandalism." The major issue in the case was whether the property
was to be assessed in the condemnation proceeding at the time of
trial or at the time the property was declared blighted." The court
held that the blight declaration date applied since the time of trial
date "may result in an award of compensation to the owner of the
property appropriated which is unreasonable and unjust under unu-
sual facts and circumstances, as are present in the case at bar."48
Probably the most significant extension of the "taking" doctrine
prior to Washington Market was Foster v. City of Detroit.49 In
living conditions were rendered intolerable by low-flying planes. See also Leavell v. United
States, 234 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.S.C. 1964); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391
P.2d 540 (1964). See generally Comment, The Airport Noise Cases: Condemnation by Nuis-
ance & Beyond, 7 WAKE F. L. REv. 271 (1971). The court also discussed recent cases concern-
ing blight declarations. See text accompanying notes 45-59 infra.
44. The court stated:
A declaration of blight is one of the early steps in an urban renewal project. Experi-
ence had shown that there is generally a considerable interval of time between such
an announcement and the eventual acquisition-whether by purchase or condemna-
tion-of property located in the blighted area. Occasionally, as was the case here, the
project will be entirely abandoned before completion. From the time it becomes gener-
ally known that an area has been selected as the site of an urban renewal project, as
we have pointed out in earlier cases cited above, there ceases to be a ready market for
premises within the area. It becomes difficult to find tenants and impossible to enter
into long-term leases. Upkeep, maintenance and renovation cease; the value of the
property tends constantly to diminish.
68 N.J. at 119-20, 343 A.2d at 414-15.
45. 118 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (1963).
46. Id. at 526, 190 N.E.2d at 54.
47. Id. at 528, 190 N.E.2d at 56.
48. Id. at 529, 190 N.E.2d at 57.
49. 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968).
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Foster, a condemnation proceeding against plaintiffs' property
lasted almost ten years before it was abandoned. It was only when
a second proceeding was commenced two years later that actual
appropriation took place. 0 However, in determining damages, the
court took into account the depreciation in value caused by the
city's actions in the first proceeding." These included the razing of
several blocks in the neighboring vicinity, telling plaintiffs that they
would receive no compensation for improvements to their property,
and publicizing the proposed condemnation. 2
Both Carcione and Foster are distinguishable from Washington
Market in two respects. First, the conduct on the part of the
government in both cases was of a more egregious and interfering
nature. In Washington Market mere delay was the extent of the
city's activities that allegedly caused the decline in plaintiff's com-
petitive position in real estate.53 In Carcione and Foster, the respec-
tive governments went considerably further by notifying individual
tenants of the impending condemnation and by razing adjacent
properties." Second, both Carcione and Foster culminated in ac-
tual condemnation.55 Although the Foster court did hold that the
aborted condemnation proceeding constituted a taking, 6 the court
was not required to reach the issue since an actual condemnation
took place just prior to the suit."
Several courts have considered the decline in market value
brought by the city's pre-taking activities in determing awards in
eminent domain proceedings, but only after condemnation actually
occurred. 8 Nevertheless, Foster foreshadowed the situation where
50. Id. at 660.
51. Id. at 662.
52. Id.
53. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
54. See text accompanying notes 45-52 supra.
55. See text accompanying notes 45-52 supra.
56. The court stated:
Thus, this court now holds that the actions of the defendant which substantially
contributed to and accelerated the decline in value of plaintiffs' property constituted
a "taking" of plaintiffs' property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, for
which just compensation must be paid.
254 F. Supp. at 665-66.
57. Id. at 660.
58. See, e.g., Elmwood Park Project Section 1, Group B v. Cassese, 376 Mich. 311, 136
N.W.2d 896 (1965); Cleveland v. Hurwitz, 19 Ohio Misc. 184, 249 N.E.2d 562 (Ohio Prob.
1969).
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recovery for dimunition in property value caused by a declaration
of blight would be warranted despite the absence of an actual con-
demnation.
Washington Market is a logical extension of those decisions that
realized the damage that may occur as a result of a government's
procrastination in initiating urban renewal. The New Jersey Su-
preme Court realized the inconsistency in recognizing dimunition in
market value after condemnation and denying it absent acquisition
of the properties by the government. The court fails, however, to
hold unequivocally that blight declarations regardless of duration
will support a cause of action under the taking provision of the state
constitution. The erosion of the traditional notions of the "taking"
doctrine that such a holding might create may be easily obviated
by the adoption of a provision in the New Jersey Constitution allow-
ing recovery not only for a governmental taking but also for property
damage caused by a governmental body without a taking. 9
Janine P. Hornicek
59. See text accompanying note 8 supra. See also Fisher v. City of Syracuse, 46 App. Div.
2d 216, 361 N.Y.S.2d 773 (4th Dep't 1974). In his concurrence Judge Goldman expressed the
hope that the state legislature would note the plight of literally hundreds of property owners
and amend the state constitution to provide for just compensation when property is taken or
damaged. Id. at 219, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 774.
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